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This paper studies a Lagos and Wright economy with endogenous
heterogeneity. In particular, the distribution of impatience (denoted
by β) across agents converges pointwise to a degenerate distribution,
the persistence of a δ-measure of agents with higher impatience, for
some δ > 0, notwithstanding. As a consequence, a non zero measure
set of agents holding idle money balances exists in the absence of
any randomness nor ex post heterogeneity. Hence, examples of LW
economies where the efficiency of equilibrium allocations is improved
by letting agents hold interest bearing assets are robust. The results
also show that coexistence of money with bonds is not ruled out by
pointwise convergence of the distribution of money over the set of
agents to a constant function. More exactly, the distribution of money
may converge pointwise but not uniformly. . .
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ACP define a bilateral matching rule and its exhaustiveness in terms of
set theoretic concepts.
The first result they give is that of existence of three pairwise disjoint sets
brought about by any bilateral matching rule. One of the three subsets sees
agents matched with themselves. This is a set of fixed points. Another sees
agents matched with the remaining set. The latter two sets have the same
cardinality.
A finite set with an odd number of agents does not admit any exhaustive
matching. A non-empty compact convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex
space does not admit any continuous exhaustive bilateral matching rule (it’s
unclear to me why.)
They go on defining a matching process, i.e. an iteration of the match-
ing technology over time, and assume it is exhaustive in the sense that it
necessarily matches every agent to someone else at every time t ≥ 1, with
t ∈ N.
Hence, ACP construct a mapping between properties of the matching pro-
cess and the degree of informational openness (i.e. the degree of anonimity)
that are consistent with a physical description of the environment (which
description?)
The fact that ACP work focuses on exogenous matching and abstracts
from its allocative effects makes it more closely related to the strand of lit-
erature aimed at building mathematical foundations for random matching
models with countable or uncountable populations. Such models are directed
at obtaining a law of large numbers for random pairwise matching.
ACP remove any stochastic elements.
Ex-post inefficiency with some agents holding idle monetary balances and
others being cash constrained is modeled as a consequence of trading shocks
in random matching monetary models (see . . . )
Accordingly, the existence of a credit market that reallocates money
across agents is desirable but has no foundation in the absence of random
shocks that hit agents and create a non-uniform distribution of impatience.
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The present paper illustrates a LW economy where heterogeneity across
agents in terms of impatience is the result of a deterministic subdivision of
the agents set, with no random shock occurring. In such an economy, a credit
market improves the allocation even though the distribution of impatience
converges pointwise to a constant function. The credit market is essential
because there exists a non-zero measure subset of most-impatient people in
every equilibrium. In addition, every agent is bound to permanently become
a low impatience agent, and no agent will ever be borrowing more than once.
Hence, the credit market is essential even if there is no role for a record
keeping technology.
[11] analyze credit sustainability when agents are matched repeatedly.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework
and the agents’ decision problem. Values are characterized in Section 3.
Section 4 states the results. The Conclusions end the paper.
2 Main result
Theorem 1 There is a subset of [0, 1] with strictly positive countably additive
and translation invariant measure with higher impatience.
Proof. Associate a rational number rt ∈ [0, 1) with each t ∈ N. Let 2−t−1 ≥
i > 2−t and define βi(x) = β̃ > β if x ∈ Pt and x = 2t+1i− 1, or βi(x) = β if
x ∈ [0, 1) ∼ Pt.
Then < βi > is a sequence of measurable real valued functions on [0, 1]
such that for each x, lim
i→0
βi(x) = β but for some α > 0 it holds that m
∗{x :
βi(x) > β} > α.
Remark. The Pt’s are pairwise disjoint, so that no agent becomes impa-
tient again.
3 The environment
The framework of analysis is a modification of LW suited for the characteri-
zation of equilibria that feature an endogenous nominal interest rate.
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Time is indexed by t ∈ N.
In each period t two markets open sequentially. The first market to open
is decentralized (DM), the second market is centralized (CM).
Agents
There is a closed unit interval [0, 1] of infinitely-lived agents, so that every
single agent is zero-measure. Thus, the chances of two single agents meeting
are zero.
Buyers in the DM are anonymous.
Consequently, trade credit cannot occur. Transactions are subject to a
quid pro quo restriction that allows money to play a role as a medium of
exchange (Kocherlakota [15] and Wallace [24]).
When an agent comes across a good she demands, the same agent bar-
gains with another agent (from a zero measure set of shop owners, e.g the
Cantor ternary set) in order to determine the terms of trade. The terms of
trade depend on the distribution of portfolios across shop owners that sell
specialized goods. Hence, the distribution of portfolios across agents induces
a distribution of portfolios across goods for sale. This distribution is a step
function with constant values on each α-measure set of goods delivered by
the same seller. This is equivalent to having an α-measure of appropriate
sellers for every buyer.
Special goods
A variety of goods is produced in the DM. Agents specialize in the pro-
duction of goods other from those they consume, so that autarky cannot be
an equilibrium.
Specification A.
Assumption A.1) Every agent specializes in the production of a single
good gi that is demanded by a zero-measure (e.g. countable) set agents. For
this to be the case, it suffices to impose that each good is demanded by at
most two agents.
Accordingly, the chances of selling the produced good are zero, though
the producer may even match a countable infinity of buyers.
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As an example, let the set of specialized goods be G. Then, every agent
i ∈ [0, 1] demands a variety of goods Gi ⊂ G with Gi having α-measure.
Gi∩Gj is nonempty with zero measure for every i 6= j, i.e. tastes across agents
differ almost everywhere. This implies that there are no goods demanded by
a nonzero measure set of agents. It also implies that if any set of goods are
demanded by a nonzero measure set of agents, then such a set of goods must
be zero measure. The set of buyers appropriate for seller i is denoted by
Bi. Hence, a1) the measure of buyers appropriate for each seller i ∈ [0, 1] is
µ = 0, while a2) the measure of sellers appropriate for each buyer i ∈ [0, 1]
is α.
a1) seems to capture Marx’s setting where producers demand money to
buy capital, a zero measure set of goods.
Does a1) imply that sellers in the DM are elements of a set distinct from
the set of buyers (with both selling labor in the CM)?
Summing up, this specification says that the measure of purchases in the
DM is α > 0 while the measure of sales is zero.
For example, this is the case if most agents (an α-measure set) work only
in the CM and buy specialized goods (produced by a zero measure set of
agents) in the DM (once a week) and general goods in the CM.
Think of people buying goods from few producers on the internet . . . think
of a village fair where lots of people go for a walk and buy from a small number
of sellers . . .
Is this like people (it’d be better with like tastes) going to malls, with a
very small number of people demanding the same particular good?
Portfolios can also be seen as distributed over special goods (in addition
to being distributed over agents), in the sense that portfolios are constant
over goods that are offered by the same shop owner. So the distribution of
portfolios over special goods may be a step function.
Every agent demands an α-measure set of goods, and meets goods rather
than sellers. This can be seen as representative of the situation where agents
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go to huge mall where lots of goods are offered by a relatively little number
of shop owners. In such a situation, the chances of a buyer coming across
goods she demands are not negligible, while the chances of a particular seller
being matched to a particular buyer are considerably fewer.
Specification B.
Assumption B.1) The measure of shop owners is zero.
Assumption B.2) Shop owners demand goods from a zero measure set
(contrasted with other agents who demand an α-measure set of goods.)
Either B.1 and B.2 jointly, or
Assumption B.3) m(Gi ∩Gj) = 0 for every i 6= j,
along with
Assumption B.4) m(Gi) = α for every i ∈ [0, 1],
imply:
i) the measure of sellers meeting appropriate goods is zero, and ii) the








in LW the measure of goods is 1.
This raises the question of where do those goods that are not produced
by any agent come from? [
⋃
i∈[0,1]
Gi] ∼ [0, 1] is a set of goods that exist in
nature (are primitive) and are owned by agents, e.g. different types of labor
abilities. Does it imply that the measure of shop producers-sellers be 1? Is
the Cantor ternary set (it has measure 0) an admissible counterexample?
The convenient feature is that value functions are considerably simpli-
fied and the constraints on numerical simulations parameterized by α is less
stringent (e.g. LW get an upper bound of 0.5 on σ, the money velocity in
the DM, which is related to α here).
It turns out that while the value of σ used in simulation by LW made no
difference, it does when it comes to simulate the nominal interest rate, i.e.
the nominal interest rate is very sensitive to α.
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Special goods are non-storable and perish at the end of the DM, so that
the only assets that can be carried onto the CM are money and bonds.
The evolution of agents portfolios
The distribution of assets holdings Ft changes as a consequence of agents
trading.
An agent entering the DM with mt exits with mt + dt(m̃t,mt) in case of
a single coincidence sale, and exits with mt − dt(mt, m̃t) in case of a single
coincidence purchase, with
As a result,
d : R2+ × N→ R+ (1)
maps Ft to Ft+.
An agent entering the CM with mt+ chooses (m
′)(mt+) = mt+1.
Agents trade assets in the CM in such a way that mt+1 is independent of
mt+ , i.e. the value of portfolios does not matter, and (m
′) is a constant.
This maps Ft+ into Ft again.
Preferences in the DM
Agents enjoy utility u (q) from q consumption in the DM, where u′ (q) > 0,
u′′ (q) < 0, u′ (0) =∞, and u′ (∞) = 0.
Furthermore, the elasticity of utility η (q) = qu′ (q) /u (q) is bounded by
assumption.
Producers incur a utility cost (a disutility) c (q) from producing q units
of output with c′ (q) > 0 and c′′ (q) ≥ 0.
Let q∗ denote the solution to u′ (q∗) = c′ (q∗).
Preferences in the CM
A single good is produced in the CM instead.
In the CM all agents consume and produce, enjoying utility U (x) from
x units of consumption, with U ′ (x) > 0, U ′ (0) = ∞, U ′ (∞) = 0 and
U ′′ (x) ≤ 0.
The same consumption can be produced from labor by each agent using
a linear technology.
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This implies that no wealth effects drive demand for money in the CM.
Hence, money demand is also independent of trading histories.
Agents discount only between time t-CM and time t+ 1-DM.
This is not restrictive since as in Rocheteau and Wright [21] all that
matters is the total discounting between successive periods.
Money supply
It is assumed a central bank exists that controls the money supply at
time t, Mt > 0.
Money supply transforms according to Mt = γMt−1. γ ∈ R+ is a constant
and new money is injected, or withdrawn if γ < 1, through transfers πMt−1 =
(γ − 1)Mt−1 to agents which types? any?.
Money transfers are lump-sum (i.e. they do not depend on agents’ behav-
ior). We restrict attention to policies where γ ≥ β, with β ∈ (0, 1) denoting
the discount factor.
Agents receive lump-sum money transfers πb at the opening of DM trade.
Let πbMt−1 = πMt−1/ (1− n) be the per agent money transfer.
The timing of events is shown in Figure 1.Make it!
Stationary equilibria
We study steady state equilibria, where aggregate real money balances
are constant.
We refer to this as a stationary equilibrium
φM = φ−1M−1 (2)
which implies that φ−1/φ = M/M−1 = γ.
The Fisher equation does not necessarily hold, hence the equivalence of
either setting the nominal interest rate or the inflation rate is not granted.
In period t, let φt = 1/Pt denote the real price of money and Pt the price
of goods in the CM.
4 Values
Under stationary equilibrium the only source of uncertainty comes from ran-
dom matching.
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Aggregate variables enter individual maximization problems as fixed pa-
rameters.
Agents decisions are then implied by (common) VFs with money m as
the only argument.
Let V (mt) denote the expected value from trading in the DM with mt
money balances.
Let W (mt+) denote the expected value from entering the CM with mt+
units of money.
It is convenient to sequentially characterize equilibria within a single pe-
riod starting from the CM.
Centralized market max problems
In the CM agents produce h units of good using h hours of labor, consume
x, and adjust their money balances.
Bonds do not mature and cannot be exchanged among agents in the CM.
The real wage per hour is normalized to one.
Discounting explicitly appears in values, Ws, calculated in CMs as they
include next period’s values, V+1s.
4.1 Representative agent’s CM problem
There is no dependence of either V or W on t. The notation mt+1 stands for
money holdings carried onto next DM.







[U (x)− h+ βV (mt+1, )] (3)
such that





with x ∈ R+, h, 0 ∈ H a connected closed and bounded subset of R+,
and mt+1 ∈ R+ denoting the money taken into period t+ 1.
For money demand to be degenerate in the CM, utility from either labor
supply or consumption must be linear. Following LW, it is assumed that
utility is a linear function of labor supply, h.
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= φtmt+ + max
x,mt+1
[U (x)− x− φtmt+1 + βV (mt+1)] (6)
where
V (mt+1, 0) (7)
is utility from buying with money.
The first order conditions with respect to x and mt+1 are
U ′ (x∗) = 1 (8)
βVmt+1(mt+1) = φt (9)
where the βVmt+1(mt+1) is the seller’s marginal benefit of taking money out
of the CM and φ is its marginal cost.
Equation (8) characterizes the optimal consumption level x∗.
Equation (9) shows that mt+1 is independent of mt, i.e. the distribution
of money holdings across sellers is degenerate at the beginning of the next
period because the quasi-linearity assumption in (3) check reference rules
out any wealth effect on money demand in the CM.????
Agents who bring too much cash into the CM spend some buying goods,
while those carrying too little sell goods.
Envelopes and no arbitrage
Rather, agents adjust money holdings in the CM so as to exploit arbitrage
opportunities as below ???
Equations (6) and (??) imply the envelope conditions
Wmt+ = φt (10)
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4.2 DMs
In the DM agents are allowed to barter, exchange specialized goods for money,
and exchange specialized goods for bonds.
Let qb and qs denote the quantities consumed by a buyer and produced
by a seller trading in the DM, respectively.
Agents may not find it optimal to carry entire portfolios to the market as
this may reduce bargaining power, but this possibility will not be considered
in what follows to simplify the analysis.
Let p be the nominal price of goods in the DM.
As anticipated, an agent carrying the portfolio mt to the DM exits with
mt + dt(m̃t,mt) in case of a single coincidence sale of the quantity qt(m̃t,mt)
to a buyer carrying the portfolio (m̃t), and exits with (mt) − dt(mt, m̃t) in
case of a single coincidence purchase of the quantity qt(mt, m̃t) from a seller
carrying the portfolio (m̃t).
Assume agents carry the entire portfolios they own to the DM, and denote
by V (mt) the value of entering the DM with portfolio mt.
Then, under Specification A, each agent i ∈ [0, 1] chooses a portfolio so
as to maximize ∫
Gi
{u[q] +W − d}+
∫
Bi
{−ν[q] +W + d} (11)






{u[qt(mtm̃t)] +W [mt − dt(mt, m̃t)]}dFt(m̃t)
+ µ
∫
{−ν[qt(mt, m̃t)] +W [(mt) + dt(m̃t,mt)]}dFt(m̃t, b̃t)
+ (1− α)W (mt)} (12)
where Ft(m̃t) denotes the (induced by sellers specialization) distribution
of portfolios across the α-measure set of goods appropriate for agent (buyer)
i, and µ = 0 is the measure of buyers appropriate for agent i.
The first term is . . .
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Assume that
W [(mt)− dt(mt, m̃t)] = W [(mt)]− φdt(mt, m̃t) (13)
and
W [(mt) + dt(m̃t,mt)] = W [(mt)] + φdt(m̃t,mt) (14)






{u[qt(mt, m̃t)]− φdt(mt, m̃t)}dFt(m̃t)
+W (mt)} (15)
LW get rid of this integral because the money the buyer pays is inde-
pendent of the seller’s money holdings (this makes the distribution of money
irrelevant but may not be realistic in some cases.)
In other words, the zero measure of sellers jointly with the independence
of the money payment on the seller’s money holdings (and, different from




{α{u[qt(mt, m̃t)]− φdt(mt, m̃t)}
+W (mt)} (16)
4.2.1 Bargaining
In the Nash problem
max
q,dt(mtm̃t),dt(mt,m̃t)
[u(q)− φdt(mt, m̃t)]θ[−ν(q) + φdt(m̃t,mt)]1−θ (17)
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what the buyer pays is equal to what the seller gets, so that
max
q,dt(mt,m̃t)
[u(q)− φdt(mt, m̃t)]θ[−ν(q) + φdt(mt, m̃t)]1−θ (18)
Assume θ = 1 so that the above problem simplifies to
max
q,dt(mt,m̃t)
[u(q)− φdt(mt, m̃t)] (19)
The solution depends both on the degree of mildness of disutility from
labor and on whether the budget constraint binds.
If disutility is mild enough and the constraint binds the solution is char-
acterized by
u′(q) > 0, λb > 0 (20)
with λb denoting the Lagrange multiplier on the buyer’s budget con-
straint, and trade is inefficient. Otherwise, u′(q) must equate the utility cost
of giving money up.
Is this expressed by
u′(q) = φ (21)
?
If the answer is yes, assume u(q) = ln(q) so that
q∗ = φ−1 (22)
so that the terms of trade are (φ−1, φ), i.e. the quantity φ−1 is exchanged
at the utility price φ of a unit of money (equivalently, for a unit of money).
If there is no disutility from labor, then the quantity produced and ex-
changed is efficient, and so d = m∗ = mt, where m
∗ is the least amount of
assets (money and bonds) sufficient to induce the seller to produce and offer
the quantity q∗.
If the answer is no, consumer equilibrium is given by
u′(q) = φp (23)
Assuming p = 1, it follows that
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q∗ = φ−1 = 1 (24)
and the terms of trade reduce to (q∗, p) = (1, 1), i.e. the quantity 1 is
exchanged at the utility price 1 of a unit of money (equivalently, for a unit
of money).
Again, if there is no disutility from labor, then the quantity produced and
exchanged is efficient, and so d = m∗ = mt, where m
∗ is the least amount of
money sufficient to induce the seller to produce and offer the quantity q∗ = 1.
The value (16) becomes
V (mt) = α(ln[1]− 1) +W (mt+) (25)
or
V (mt) = −α +W (mt+) (26)
Assume linear utility in the CM, U(x) = x, and use (5) to get
V (mt) = −α + max
(mt+1)
{φtmt+ − φtmt+1 + βV (mt+1)} (27)
where φ(mt+ −mt+1) is the value of money inside next period portfolio
net of the cost of acquiring it, and (??) implies maximization only w.r.t.
mt+1.
The term ν0(s) in LW2002 is zero hero.
Hence,
V (mt) = −α + max
mt+1
{φtmt+ − φtmt+1 + βV (mt+1)} (28)
Repeated substitution gives





{−φjmj+1 + β[νj+1(mj+1) + φj+1mj+1]}(29)
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or





{mj+1(βφj+1 − φj} (30)
This is simpler than LW as we got rid of their νt+1 which depended on
Ft+1, νt+1(Ft+1). So there is no dependence of the sequence of m
′
js on Ft+1
(LW say it only influence the intercept of the VF and not the mt+1).




then there is no solution to the problem of choosing mt+1. . . why? Is the
no-arbitrage condition of help?
Looks like equilibrium requires βφj+1 < φj as in LW. Does it imply that
the optimal mt+1 is zero and agents only hold bonds? Yes it implies m
∗
t+1 = 0.
Don’t know if bonds are positive.
Notice that LW characterize monetary equilibrium by any path for {qt+1}
satisfying mt+1 < m
∗
t+1 (LW, p. 472).
If φj+1 = φj as, given bt+ , eq. (??) suggests (this holds also because of
Lemma 3 in LW2002) . . . then βφj+1 < φj holds and m
∗
t+1 = 0. If so, then
V (mt, bt) = −α + φtmt+ .
Whose hands the money spent in the CM goes? As nobody is carrying
any money into next DM, everybody must be spending the whole of money
holdings (including money injection which takes place at the beginning of
the CM).
Hence, agents find it optimal to maximize the value of their portfolios
and the portfolio constraint always binds. As a consequence, neither the
equilibrium demand for money nor for bonds can be zero. Hence, money and
bonds coexist? Even though agents try to substitute money for bonds . . .
. . .
General bargaining solution
The general solution characterized by LW consists of the seller spending
the dt(m, m̃) = min(mt,m
∗).
If mt = min(mt,m
∗) then the buyer gets qt(m, m̃) = q̃t(m) ≤ q∗.
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If m∗ = min(mt,m
∗) the cash constraint is not binding and the buyer gets
qt(m, m̃) = q
∗ (and eventually disposes or what of excess money holdings?)
(This consists of either the seller exchanging all of his money holdings
(dt(m, m̃) = m) for a quantity weakly less than the efficient level qt(m, m̃) =
q̃t(m) ≤ q∗ (ifmt ≤ m∗ withm∗ denoting the least amount of money sufficient
to buy q∗), or the buyer giving all of her money holdings (dt(m, m̃) = m <
m∗t ) up for a lesser quantity (mt < m
∗ and the budget constraint is binding.))
Hence, in LW the solution to the bargaining problem only depends on the
buyer’s money holdings mt and I cannot get any discount from a starving
seller!
Remark. The LW solution to the bargaining problem⇒ the buyer cannot
get any utility from money in excess of m∗ ⇒ ν ′t+1(mt+1) = 0 for all mt+1 ≥
m∗t+1. ⇒ any equilibrium must satisfy φt ≥ βφt+1.
If bonds allow buyers to get utility from that extra cash, will the minimum
inflation rate consistent with equilibrium still be the Freidman rule? see LW
p. 471.
Let agents with more than m∗ lend to those with less. This should be
welfare improving as more people consume closer to (at) the efficient level.
There is a role for credit with no banks, no government, and no ex-post
heterogeneity!
Is m∗t+1 = m
∗?
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